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Abstract
This Essay examines how Annex 1-B on Regional Stabilization of the General Framework
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (“GFA”) can achieve a political solution to con-
flicts in the former Yugoslavia through the limitation and transparency of the military forces and
conventional weapons of the Parties.
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I. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT
In no area is the effect of international law on political sta-
bility more recently evidenced than in the events of the former
Yugoslavia. The four years of conflict in that region finally
culminated in the Bosnian Peace Accords - the General Frame-
work Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina ("Agree-
ment" or "GFA"). 1 This Agreement was negotiated at Wright-
Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, signed in Paris, and entered into
force on December 14, 1995.2 The five parties to the Agreement
are the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of
Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republika Srpska.'
A major goal of the Agreement is to create and, through the
legal commitments made by all five parties, maintain stability in
the region. Many would argue that, absent a true commitment
by all the parties to the Agreement to make it work, such an
* The Author, a member of the New York Bar, is employed by the U.S. Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency in the Office of General Counsel. Interpretations, opin-
ions, or conclusions in this Essay should be understood to be solely those of the Author
and should not be attributed to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
1. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina With An-
nexes, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75 (1996) [hereinafter GFA].
2. See Craig R. Whimey, Balkan Accord: The Overview; Balkan Foes Sign Peace Pact,
Dividing an Unpacified Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1995, at A2 (discussing various ele-
ments of peace accord signed on previous day in Paris).
3. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herze-
govina, and Republika Srpska are three of the five Parties to the GFA and the Annex 1-
B Agreement. However, according to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to
which the three above are Parties, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("Bosnia
and Herzegovina") continues its legal existence under international law as a state and
remains a Member of the United Nations and may maintain and apply for membership
in international organizations. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
Republika Srpska make up the two Entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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international agreement cannot accomplish a lasting peace. Of
course, any agreement is only as effective as the parties' willing-
ness to abide by its provisions. Nevertheless, the use of interna-
tional law to address a situation that politics alone has been un-
able to settle has provided the most promising effort to combat
the instability in the region.
The GFA addresses several aspects of stabilization in the for-
mer Yugoslavia. The wide range of issues addressed in the
Agreement covers the many areas that will need to be settled
before the achievement of peace in the region. These important
areas include: the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Re-
gional Stabilization measures, the establishment of Bosnia and
Herzegovina corporations, the establishment of a commission to
preserve national monuments, an agreement on refugees and
displaced persons, an agreement on Human Rights, and a com-
mitment by the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
Republika Srpska to binding arbitration to resolve disputes that
arise between them.
As noted, the GFA provides the legal framework for achiev-
ing a political solution to conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.
This Essay examines how one section of the GFA, Annex 1-B on
Regional Stabilization,4 can accomplish that goal through the
limitation and transparency of the military forces and conven-
tional weapons of the Parties.
II. ANNEX -B OF TILE GFA
The civil war in the former Yugoslavia posed a very real
threat to broader European security and stability and thus was a
real concern for many countries, both inside and outside Eu-
rope. The many areas addressed in the GFA, as noted above,
reflect the view that security and stability, both regional and
global, are the result of more than just military factors, but con-
sist also of such elements as human rights and economic stabil-
ity. Nevertheless, to some degree, Europe has become depen-
dent for its share of security on relationships that are codified in
arms control treaties and related international agreements. An-
nex 1-B of the Agreement, entitled "Agreement of Regional Sta-
bilization," addresses the issue of military stability in the former
4. GFA, supra note 1, 35 I.L.M. at 108.
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Yugoslavia. It is an attempt to build a lasting peace for Bosnia
and the Balkans and to assist that region in integrating into the
broader process of European architecture. More specifically,
this Annex obligates the parties to negotiate and agree to arms
control and confidence-building measures. Annex 1-B consists of
five Articles that obligate the parties to enter into different
agreements on regional stabilization. Article I of Annex 1-B sets
forth the general obligations of the parties, which are to estab-
lish "progressive measures for regional stability and arms con-
trol," to create a stable peace in the region, to cooperate in
building transparency and confidence, and to work toward
avoidance of an arms race in the region. The five parties have
agreed to strive for a defense at the lowest military level consis-
tent with each parties' security needs.
Article II of Annex 1-B addresses "Confidence-and-Security-
Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina." This Article
provides that three of the five parties, the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and the Republika Srpska, shall enter into an obligation to
"agree upon a series of measures to enhance mutual confidence
and reduce the risk of conflict."5 Negotiations for Article II were
to: commence within seven days after Annex 1-B entered into
force; be completed within forty-five days of entry into force of
the Annex II Agreement; be conducted under the auspices of
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
("OSCE"), which is located in Vienna, Austria; and draw fully
upon the 1994 Vienna Document of the Negotiations for Confi-
dence- and Security-Building Measures of the OSCE6 and the
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty ("CFE").7 In accordance
5. Id. at 109.
6. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe ("OSCE"), formerly
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ("CSCE"), is a multilateral fo-
rum of which all European states, the United States, Canada, and several Central Asian
states are participants. The original CSCE was formalized in Helsinki, Finland, on Au-
gust 1, 1975, when 35 leaders from Europe and North America signed the Final Act or
Helsinki Accords. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Aug.
1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292. This document is a political commitment composed of three
major parts addressing military, economic, and human rights aspects. Id. The Vienna
Document 1994 contains enhanced confidence-building measures building on the Vi-
enna Document 1992, which encompassed enhanced provisions of the Helsinki Ac-
cords.
7. Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Nov. 19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 1
(1991) [hereinafter CFE Treaty]. The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty ("CFE
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with Annex 1-B, the Article II Agreement was completed within
45 days after entry into force of Annex 1-B.8 The Article II
Agreement entered into force on January 26, 1996.
Annex 1-B provides that the Article II Agreement will ad-
dress several issues relating to confidence-building, including:
restrictions on military deployments and exercises in certain geo-
graphical areas, restrictions on heavy weapons, notification of
disbandment of special operations and armed civilian groups,
identification of and monitoring of weapons manufacturing ca-
pabilities, and the immediate establishment of military liaison
missions between the Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the Federa-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska.
From this list, one notices the extent to which this legal docu-
ment will go toward fostering transparency, communication, and
arms restrictions among the three parties. It is questionable, as
the years before the Article II Agreement have shown, whether
political pressures alone, absent a legal commitment by all the
parties, could have resulted in the parties agreeing to such intru-
sive measures.
Article III of the Annex 1-B Agreement addresses "Regional
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures."9 It provides that
all five Parties to the GFA will "initiate steps toward a regional
agreement on confidence- and security-building measures." 10
Specifically, Article III provides that the parties shall:
1) not import any arms for ninety days after Annex I-B
enters into force; and
2) not import for 180 days after the Annex enters into
fo'rce or until the Article IV Agreement of the Annex
takes effect, whichever is earlier, heavy weapons ammuni-
tion, mines, military aircraft, and helicopters.
Treaty") entered into force in November 1992. One goal of the CFE Treaty is to en-
hance stability by ending force disparities and so limit the capability for launching sur-
prise attack or initiating large-scale, sustained, offensive action in Europe. Id. These
limits have been accomplished through the verifiable and irreversible destruction or
conversion to non-military purposes of an unprecedented amount of equipment, by
methods that were precisely prescribed by the CFE Treaty. Id.
8. The "Article II Agreement" refers to Article II of the Agreement on Confidence-
and Security-Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina which was completed in
accordance with Annex 1-B, Article II.
9. GFA, supra note 1, 35 I.L.M. at 109.
10. Id.
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These two stipulations are an attempt to limit the influx of
arms into the region as soon as the GFA and Annex 1-B entered
into force. It is a means to foster quick stability in the region,
constituting an interim measure until the arms limitations to be
agreed under Article IV of Annex 1-B take effect. 1
Article TV of Annex 1-B is entitled "Measures for Sub-Re-
gional Arms Control." All five parties to the GFA are to be par-
ties to the Article IV Agreement and are obligated to commence
negotiations on Article IV, specifically, on agreed numerical lim-
its on tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft,
and attack helicopters, within thirty days after the entry into
force of the Annex.
The Article IV limitations on conventional armaments will
be based, at a minimum, on factors of population size, current
military armament holdings, defense needs, and relative force
levels in the region. If the five parties are unable to agree on the
limitation of conventional armaments within 180 days after entry
into force of Annex 1-B,12 the limit for conventional armaments
for the parties will be a 5:2:2 ratio, based on the approximate
ratio of populations of the parties. The 5:2:2 ratio refers to the
numerical limits of conventional armaments for the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Croatia, and the three par-
ties to the Article II Agreement, respectively.1 " In addition, the
parties agree that within thirty days after entry into force of the
Annex, they will begin negotiations on an agreement on volun-
tary limits on military manpower. Annex 1-B provides that the
11. Article IV must be agreed to within 180 days after entry into force of the An-
nex.
12. As noted, these 180 days coincide with the above-mentioned obligation taken
by the parties in Article III to the Annex.
13. Regarding a possible 5:2:2 ratio of numerical limits to be applied to conven-
tional armaments, Article IV also provides the following:
(a) the baseline shall be the determined holdings of conventional armament
and equipment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the "baseline");
(b) the limits for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall be seventy-five per-
cent of the baseline;
(c) the limits for the Republic of Croatia shall be thirty percent of the base-
line; (d) the limits for Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be thirty percent of the
baseline; and
(e) the allocations for Bosnia and Herzegovina will be divided between the
Entities on the basis of a ratio of two for the Federation of Bosnia and Herze-
govina and one for the Republika Srpska.
GFA, supra note 1, 35 I.L.M. at 110.
OSCE is obligated to assist the parties in the negotiations of Arti-
cle II and IV agreements and in the subsequent implementation
and verification of any such agreements.
Article V of Annex 1-B is entitled "Regional Arms Control
Agreement." This Article provides that the OSCE will assist all
five parties in organizing and conducting negotiations to estab-
lish a regional balance in and around the former Yugoslavia.
The phrase "in and around the former Yugoslavia" may necessar-
ily require those states surrounding the former Yugoslavia, states
not party to the GFA and Annex 1-B, to take specific actions and
assume obligations to facilitate a regional balance; however, it is
unclear at the time this Essay is written what states will constitute
all the Article V parties. In addition, according to the Article V
obligations set forth in Annex 1-B, the five parties will establish a
commission to facilitate the resolution of any dispute that might
arise among them.
A. The Article II Agreement
The Article II Agreement' 4 is lengthy, covering a wide range
of confidence-building measures among the three Parties to that
Agreement. The Article II Agreement encompasses many provi-
sions contained in the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty
("CFE Treaty"),15 a treaty among the NATO, ex-Warsaw, and for-
mer Soviet Union states intended to limit the amount of conven-
tional armed forces on the territory of those states parties.
Article II of the Article II Agreement addresses exchange of
military information among the parties to that Agreement.
These provisions on exchange of information have their history
in prior arms control agreements, most notably the CFE Treaty
and the Vienna Documents, where such exchange of informa-
tion on the conventional armaments of the parties helped to fos-
ter openness and transparency among the parties. The informa-
tion that must be exchanged in accordance with Article II in-
clude: (a) demonstration of new types of major weapon and
equipment systems; (b) information on plans for deployment of
14. Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, art. II, adopted pursuant to GFA, supra note 1, Annex 1-B, art. II, 35 I.L.M. at
108 (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter Article II Agree-
ment].
15. CFE Treaty, supra note 7, 30 I.L.M. at 1.
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major weapons and equipment systems; (c) information of de-
fense related matters; (d) observation of and constraints on cer-
tain military activities; (e) restrictions on deployment and exer-
cises in certain geographic areas; (f) restraint on the reintroduc-
tion of foreign forces; and (g) withdrawal of forces and heavy
weapons from cantonment/barracks.
Article II of the Article II Agreement has other provisions
relating to notifications of equipment of the parties to foster sta-
bility in the region. The parties are obligated, on an annual ba-
sis, to exchange information on specified military organizations,
manpower, and major weapons. The information exchanged
would include notifications on personnel and organizations with
military capability, including national guards, military reserves,
military police, the ministry of internal affairs special troops, po-
lice, and paramilitary troops with conventional armaments. Data
on new weapons are to be exchanged and photographs of the
equipment will accompany the information notified. When a
new type of weapon is introduced, the party introducing that
weapon must arrange a demonstration for the representatives of
the other parties. All of the information must be exchanged in
an agreed format and the above information must also be pro-
vided to the OSCE as well. This elaborate scheme for exchange
of information among the parties provides a basis for the verifi-
cation of compliance with the provisions of the Agreement.
All three parties must also inform each other, and the
OSCE, of such things as the training programs for their armed
forces and planned changes thereto in the forthcoming years,
the size, structure, personnel, major weapons and equipment sys-
tems, deployment of their armed forces and the proposed
changes thereto, and their realization of the intentions previ-
ously notified under this Article II Agreement. The parties must
also inform each other, and the OSCE, of changes in command
structure or equipment holdings, and such information is to be
verified according to the relevant provisions contained in the
Protocol on Verification to Article 11.16
In an attempt to open up to scrutiny other military activities
of the parties, Article II provides for information to be given on
"unusual military activities" as well as a special category of "notifi-
16. Protocol on Verification, in Article II Agreement, supra note 14, at Annex 1.
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able military activities." Many of these provisions have their ori-
gin in other arms control agreements.
Unusual military activities must also be reported by the par-
ties. Such unusual activities are not defined in the Article II
Agreement, but would consist of any military activity that, by its
nature, raises the concern of another party or the OSCE. If a
party has concerns about another party conducting an unusual
military activity, it may request such party provide information
on its activity, and a reply to the request must be made within
forty-eight hours of receipt of the request. After considering the
reply received, the requesting party may ask for a meeting with
the responding party to discuss the issue. If there is no clarifica-
tion reached that would produce agreement, the OSCE is obli-
gated to issue an impartial assessment of the situation.
The Article II Agreement also encompasses a category of
"notifiable military activities," which consists of those activities
that, before such activities can commence, must be notified to
the other parties and the OSCE. 17 These notifications not only
foster openness among the parties, but also reduce tensions that
would normally result from a party witnessing the activity and
buildup of the other party's military. The types of activities to be
notified include the engagement of equipment that exceed any
of the following categories, at anytime during the activity: 1500
troops (including support personnel); 40 artillery pieces; 40 ar-
mored combat vehicles; 25 battle tanks; 5 combat helicopters; or
3 combat aircraft. If such a notifiable activity is reported, the
other parties may send observers to the location of those activi-
ties.
In addition, the Article II Agreement provides for "con-
straining measures" for certain military activities. The parties
must limit the activities falling within these categories. These ac-
tivities are limited mainly as the result of the large number of
conventional armaments that are involved, and the concern for
the potential conflict that could result if such activities were to
go unregulated. One of the constraining measures, for example,
provides that no party shall simultaneously carry out in 1996 and
1997 more than one military activity involving more than any
one of the following: 4000 troops, including support; 100 ar-
17. The notification is made 42 days or more in advance of the start of the notifi-
able activity.
1996] 1927
1928 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNTAL [Vol. 19:1920
mored combat vehicles; 20 helicopters; 80 battle tanks; 15 com-
bat aircraft; or 100 artillery pieces."8 In addition, the duration of
any activity shall not exceed the duration specified in the annual
calendar, and such activities cannot be conducted within ten ki-
lometers of an international border, within either side of the In-
ter-Entity Boundary Line between the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. The parties must notify
each other and the OSCE of the conduct of military activities
that are subject to constraining measures including preliminary
information on the activity, its general purpose, time-frame and
duration, area, size, and planned forces involved.
The three parties to Article II of Annex 1-B also agree to
notify each other and the OSCE of the status of any foreign mili-
tary personnel present on their territory. They must also with-
draw their forces and heavy weapons to cantonments/barracks;
provide notifications of when they are removing heavy weapons
or forces from cantonments/barracks; and return immediately
after the conclusion of the exercises those forces or weapons
that were removed. Those forces or heavy weapons not removed
must be demobilized or disbanded. The parties must also com-
mence an investigation of any armed civilian group it becomes
aware exists on its territory, and, if such a group does exist, that
party is obligated to disband that group not later than forty-eight
hours after the conclusion of the investigation. The parties must
provide notifications of all weapons manufacturing facilities by
name and exact location, and will exchange visits between mem-
bers of the armed forces at all levels and conduct. On a volun-
tary basis, the parties may conductjoint military training and ex-
ercises. Seminars on cooperation between the armed forces of
the parties and the exchange of visits to military bases are also to
occur.
The aforementioned provisions are a sample of the obliga-
tions contained in the lengthy Article II Agreement. The Article
II Agreement clearly strives to create an environment of trans-
parency and trust among the three parties through notifications,
observations of military exercises, visits to military sites, and com-
munication among the parties' militaries. The parties' agree-
ment to this type of openness and intrusiveness in all aspects of
the military could only have been accomplished through intense
18. There are provisions for constraining measures for and after 1997 as well.
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negotiations followed by a legal document to which all parties
are equally bound, again suggesting the importance and force of
international law in the accomplishment of political stability in
the region.
B. The Protocol on Verification of the Article I Agreement
The Protocol on Verification gives further evidence of the
intrusiveness the three parties have agreed to in furtherance of
stability in the former Yugoslavia. The Protocol is one of five
Protocols of the Article II Agreement. 19 The Protocol on Verifi-
cation sets forth the details, rights and obligations for the base-
line validation period,2" and a residual period for the duration
of the Agreement. The OSCE is responsible for assisting the par-
ties in carrying out the inspections by, among other things, shar-
ing reports with the parties, facilitating technical support for
those inspections, and having countries provide technical sup-
port and inspectors and, on a national basis, cover the costs of
the technical support and inspectors.
The Protocol on Verification provides in great detail, what
may be done during an inspection. 1 The inspectors, for exam-
ple, shall be permitted access, entry, and unobstructed inspec-
tion within the entire territory of the inspection site, with some
exceptions. The inspectors can look into a hardened aircraft
shelter to determine whether any conventional armaments are
present. If conventional armaments are located, the inspectors
may determine their number and type, model, or version. In
some circumstances, the inspecting party can conduct helicopter
overflight of the inspection site, and the inspectors can take pho-
tographs, including video, for the purpose of recording the pres-
ence of conventional armaments. These activities are intended
to ensure verification of compliance with the provisions of the
Article II Agreement.
19. The other Protocols consist of: the Protocol on Exchange of Information and
Notifications, the Protocol on Existing Types, the Protocol on the Joint Consultative
Commission, and the Protocol on the Establishment of Military Liaison Missions.
There is also an Annex on Communications and a document on Procedures for Accred-
itation of Journalists Accompanying Observers to Notifiable Military Activities.
20. The "baseline validation period" is the specified time period consisting of the
first 120 days following the date of validity of the exchanged baseline data on conven-
tional weapons in 1996.
21. These are the same conventional armaments that are limited in the CFE
Treaty. See supra note 7 and accompanying test (describing scope of CFE Treaty).
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On the other hand, inspectors only have the right of access
to conventional armaments and equipment as is necessary to
confirm, visually, their number and type, model, or version.
During such inspections, the inspectors cannot interfere directly
with ongoing activities at the site and shall avoid hampering or
delaying operations. The inspected party can shroud individual
sensitive items of equipment, and the inspectors cannot enter
structures that are not configured for the entrance or exit of
heavy weapons but rather are only large enough for the transit of
personnel. No information obtained during an inspection can
be disclosed publicly without the consent of both the inspecting
and inspected parties.
These provisions are further examples of the detail and in-
trusiveness on military operations of the parties to the Article II
Agreement. They also reflect the degree to which the parties
want to be assured that no other party is circumventing provi-
sions of that Agreement. The negotiations of other arms con-
trols agreements have demonstrated that the level of intrusive-
ness contained in the Protocol on Verification is an important
part of any international agreement that obligates a state to con-
strain its military activities or in any way places limits on the use
of a state's military forces.
C. Other Protocols to the Article H Agreement
As noted, the Protocol of Verification is one of five Proto-
cols to the Article II Agreement. The Agreement also has an
Annex on Communications2" and a document on Procedures
for Accreditation of Journalists Accompanying Observers to No-
tifiable Military Activities. 3 These documents provide further
details on provisions contained in the Article II Agreement text
and create additional and necessary legally binding commit-
ments. These additional commitments reinforce the importance
of a legal framework for achieving political stability in the for-
mer Yugoslavia.
In brief, the Protocol on Exchange of Information and Noti-
22. Annex on Communications, in Article II Agreement, supra note 14, at An-
nex 4.
23. Procedure for Acceditation of Journalists Accompanying Observers to Notifi-
able Military Activities, in Article II Agreement, supra note 14, at Annex 6.
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fications24 provides specific details on the way information is to
be exchanged between the parties and the OSCE, including pro-
visions for the formats of such information exchanged. The Pro-
tocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equip-
ment 25 sets forth the types of conventional armaments that are
subject to the Article II Agreement.
The Protocol on the Joint Consultative Commission 26 stipu-
lates that the Joint Consultative Commission is composed of one
high-level representatives of each party and a representative
from the OSCE. An important goal of the Joint Consultative
Commission'is to "address questions relating to compliance with
or possible circumvention of the provisions of the Agreement...
and to resolve ambiguities and differences of interpretation that
may become apparent in the way the Agreement is imple-
mented. 27 The establishment of this Commission was done in
the tradition of recent arms control treaties, the majority of
which establish such Commissions to address issues related to
compliance of those Agreements. 28 They serve an important
function in that respect.
The Protocol on the Establishment of Military Liaisons Mis-
sions provides general guidelines and details on the procedures
of these Missions. Specifically, the Missions are between the
Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the Federation of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina and the Republika Srpska. The Missions are to be com-
posed of one military representative and not more than four as-
sistants and two administrative staff. The parties will exchange
Missions and allocate them with associations and working offices
near the main military headquarters of the Chiefs of the Armed
Forces of the receiving party. The Missions will maintain liaison
with the military commands of the party to whom they are ac-
24. Protocol on Exchange of Information and Notifications, in Article II Agree-
ment, at Annex 2.
25. Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment, in
Article II Agreement, supra note 14, at Annex 3.
26. Protocol on the Joint Consultative Commission, in Article II Agreement, supra
note 14 at Annex 5.
27. Id.
28. An example is the Joint Consultative Group, which is comprised of representa-
tives of each of the States Parties, and among other things, addresses issues of treaty
compliance. Another example is the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Es..
tablished by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ("Start I"). Treaty with the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
Nov. 25, 1991, U.S.-U.S.S.R., S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-20.
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credited (normally the receiving party), the OSCE, the multina-
tional military Implementation Force ("IFOR") ,'29 and establish
direct contacts between the receiving party and the sending
party in case of emergency or if so requested by one of the par-
ties.
The Annex on Communications' provides information on
the form of transmission of information and notification re-
quired by the Article II Agreement. Specifically, all communica-
tions must be in English as well as the native language of the
party concerned. All information and notifications required by
the Article II Agreement must also be in written form. Lastly,
the document on Procedures for Accreditation ofJournalists sets
forth the procedures required of journalists that are permitted
to attend observed military activities. The OSCE may, if agreed
to by the receiving party, request the attendance of international
journalists, and each party can decide whom and how many jour-
nalists the receiving party shall be requested to accept.
D. Article IV of Annex 1-B
The Article IV Agreement was in the process of negotiations
at the time this Essay was written. As noted earlier, Article IV of
Annex 1-B will be among all five parties to the GFA. The provi-
sions that will be in Article IV will reinforce the obligations
agreed to in Article I as well as create new obligations for all five
parties. Besides notifications and inspections, Article IV will go
beyond what has been agreed to in Article II in that it will actu-
ally place limits on the amount of conventional armaments each
party can possess. These limits will be placed on tanks, artillery,
armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft, and attack helicop-
ters.3 ' Such limits will likely take the form of actual reductions
of such conventional armaments by each of the five parties.3 2 To
29. The Implementation Force ("IFOR") is authorized to consist of ground, air,
and maritime units from NATO and non-NATO nations, deployed to Bosnia and Herze-
govina to help ensure compliance with the provisions of the GFA. The Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republika
Srpska agreed that, for a period of about one year, a force would assist in the implemen-
tation of the territorial and other military aspects of the GFA.
30. Annex on Communications, in Article II Agreement, supra note 14, at An-
nex 6.
31. The definitions of each type of equipment is identical to that used in relevant
sections of the CFE Treaty, with minor additions.
32. As noted earlier, this is similar to what has occurred in the implementation of
verify that the parties are complying with their Article IV obliga-
tions, some sort of verification mechanism in the form of inspec-
tions will be necessary, as in the Article II Agreement.
Much of what will be agreed to in Article IV, and what has
been agreed to in Article II, will be used as a basis for the future
agreement of Article V, which is to address the regional balance
"in and around" the former Yugoslavia. No date for the negotia-
tions on Article V was set at the time this Essay was written.
III. CONCLUSION
The GFA is a clear example of the way in which interna-
tional law can be used as a vehicle to restore and maintain polit-
ical stability in many parts of the world. It is the legal framework
for achieving a political solution to the former Yugoslavia. The
parties to the Agreement had to continue difficult negotiations
to reach an agreement that, to have any effect on the conflict in
the former Yugoslavia, had to be reflected in a legal document,
that would continue to obligate the parties once the negotiations
were completed. Only through such a legal document in which
all parties agree to the steps needed for stability, could any real
beginning for that process have a chance. The provisions of the
Agreement call for very intrusive measures that will be necessary
for peace and stability. There are already positive signs of the
parties working toward political stability in the region as they im-
plement and continue negotiations on these Agreements. In
March 1996, for example, Bosnian Serb, Muslim, and Croat mili-
tary traveled to the Multi-Service Center for Arms Verification
located in Italy. This Center is normally used to train Italian in-
spectors for CFE inspections in addition to inspections for other
treaties. The three groups traveled to the Center for a four-day
course in methods for verifying compliance with the arms con-
trol aspects of the GFA. At least twenty-five Bosnian military per-
sonnel, divided equally among the three ethnic groups, partici-
pated. This was the first time since the conflicts in the former
Yugoslavia began that these military groups trained together.
In spite of this, political realities can work against such suc-
cesses resulting from the legal mechanisms established in the
the CFE Treaty whereby each State Party to that Treaty has been obligated to, in most
cases, reduce each category of their conventional armaments to a prescribed agreed
number.
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Agreements. As a case in point, Bosnian Serb representatives to
the Article IV negotiations in Vienna, boycotted negotiating ses-
sions for one week in early 1996 in light of disputes with NATO
and Bosnia's Muslim-Croat Federation over the arrest, on Janu-
ary 30, 1996, of two Bosnian Serb military leaders for alleged war
crimes."3 In addition, in Sarajevo, Republika Srpska representa-
tives did not attend meetings of the Military Liaison Officers in
response to the detained Bosnian Serbs. The Republika Srpska
also reportedly detained two photojournalists in Grbivica in early
February 1996.
Such negative political occurrences will likely continue to
have an impact on the negotiations and the implementation of
these Agreements. It will be important to make sure that none
of the Annex 1-B Agreements fall apart during the implementa-
tion stage of those Agreements. It may prove difficult to con-
vince parties to begin exchanging notifications; to limit their
conventional armaments and military exercises; and to open
their military exercises to observers as required by the Article II
Agreement.34 There may be mistrust among the parties that
would work against other obligations they have made in the
Agreement. However, if the proper political will and deference
to international legal obligations does exist, there may be an op-
portunity for success in obtaining the goals for regional stabiliza-
tion in the former Yugoslavia that are outlined in these legal
documents.
33. Theresa Hitchens, Bosnian Arms Talks Make Good Strides, DEF. NEws, Feb. 19-25,
1996. Negotiations resumed February 29, 1996, upon the return of the Republika Srp-
ska to the talks.
34. Diplomats and independent observers to the Agreement and the political situ-
ation in the region have stated that there are questions as to whether Balkan leaders will
live up to their arms control commitments. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying
text (describing right of access granted to inspectors of military-related facilities).
